Young family firms: Financing decisions and the willingness to dilute control by Keasey, Kevin et al.
1 
 
Young family firms: Financing decisions and the willingness 
to dilute control 
 
Abstract 
We study the relationship between leverage and the willingness of listed family firms to 
dilute control, proxied by the ownership of the main shareholder. We find that the main 
owner’s stake positively impacts on leverage and that this impact is stronger when the 
business is a young family firm. Furthermore, the life cycle matters when analyzing this 
relationship. These results allow us to argue that owners with a greater stake prefer to 
raise finance via debt rather than dilute their position via equity, and that family firms 
face a trade-off between their control risk aversion and the need for external financing. 
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1. Introduction 
Family firms form a significant part of most economies (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Morck 
et al., 2005; Barontini and Caprio, 2006), but their financing decisions (capital 
structure) have been relatively ignored by mainstream finance. Research on capital 
structure within mainstream finance is based primarily on four theories: trade-off, 
pecking order, timing and inertia (Welch, 2004; Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Jong et al., 
2010; Serrasqueiro and Maçãs, 2012). The incentives of controlling shareholders to 
influence capital structure decisions have not, however, been studied extensively 
(Schmid, 2013). 
A major feature of family firms that is likely to impact on their financing 
decisions is the willingness of the main owner to dilute their control over the business. 
On the premise that the equity in the hands of the main owner can be used as a proxy for 
their willingness to dilute control, this paper specifically analyses the relationship 
between leverage and the equity holding of the main owner, among listed family firms. 
This allows us to understand how target leverage is dependent on the specific behavior 
of a firm’s main owner, whose aversion to diluting control over the business is studied 
in different situations. In particular, we compare the willingness to dilute control in 
family and non-family firms; we consider the particular case of young family firms; and 
we study this willingness over the different life-cycle stages of the business. 
Using a European sample of 1,050 listed firms (8,357 observations) for the 
period 2000–2009, we find that leverage is positively related to the ownership of the 
main shareholder, and that this relationship is stronger when the business is a young 
family firm (because such firms are less willing to dilute control through equity issue). 
In addition, we find that the relationship between ownership and leverage is positive for 
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mature firms, neutral for revival firms and negative for growth firms (given their 
different investment opportunities and access to debt financing). 
This paper differs from prior work on capital structure (Berger et al., 1997; 
Harvey et al., 2004; Du and Dai, 2005; Berry et al., 2006; Liu and Tian, 2012) in several 
ways. First, we study the ownership–leverage relationship in the context of listed firms 
only, where there is more potential to finance investment via equity than debt. This 
study is therefore different from the research on small and medium-sized businesses, 
such as in La Rocca et al. (2011), where the two relevant sources of financing are debt 
and internal funds (with debt possibly offering the better funds for investment). 
Consideration of a listed firm sample in this context is important to understanding that 
the willingness of a firm to dilute control has a different effect on leverage depending 
on the financing source that represents the greatest loss of control. 
Second, we consider different predispositions to dilute control between family 
and non-family firms, since owners of the former group may have non-economic as 
well as economic goals and be more attached to the business. While our results show no 
differences between family and non-family firms, we find that differences do exist when 
the business is a young family firm. Thus we provide an understanding of the different 
importance that old and young family firms attach to the financing options for the 
business. The conflicts between family members that often occur during the succession 
process (arising from the dilution of family ownership and varying attachments to the 
family firm; see Blumentritt et al., 2013) lead to different propensities to dilute control 
between young family firms (where this succession process has not yet occurred) and 
old family firms (where the succession process does need to be handled). 
Third, we include the organization’s life-cycle stages as another variable 
moderating the ownership–leverage relationship. We contribute by considering two 
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factors that affect the willingness of a firm’s main owner to dilute control: the firm’s 
investment opportunities and its access to debt financing. The more the investment 
opportunities and the less the access to debt financing, the greater will be the 
willingness to dilute control via the issue of equity. These two factors appear to be 
different for growth, mature and revival businesses. Thus, by studying the willingness to 
dilute control for different life-cycle stages, we are able to control for these two factors 
affecting the financing decisions of firms. 
Fourth, we contribute to the life-cycle literature with the development of a 
hybrid clustering method to identify a firm’s life-cycle stages. Cluster analysis allows us 
to consider jointly multiple variables that categorize the stages, and the hybrid method 
enables us to overcome the problem of hierarchical methods in large samples where 
early combinations persist throughout the analysis and induce artificial results. 
Our final contribution relates to the system generalized method of moments 
(system GMM) estimator used to test the hypotheses. This approach makes it possible 
to overcome two common problems in the ownership structure literature: first, the study 
of the relationship between ownership and leverage suffers from problems of 
endogeneity that can be solved with the use of instrumental variables; second, some 
unobservable factors or individual effects are correlated with the independent variables 
and affect the dependent variable. For instance, the family attachment to the business, 
which affects leverage, may influence the level of ownership, the length of stay of 
family members in the firm, and other firm characteristics. The system GMM estimator 
allows us to mitigate these two problems, which cannot be overcome by other 
estimators such as ordinary least squares. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a 
literature review and describes the theoretical framework and hypothesis development. 
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Section 3 presents the research method. Section 4 reports and discusses the main 
findings and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review and research hypotheses 
2.1. Capital structure and the willingness to dilute control 
One strand of the capital structure literature is the relationship between ownership and 
leverage. Firms with a higher ownership concentration will have access to better 
conditions when issuing debt, since the blockholders’ commitment to the business will 
be seen as more reliable. But blockholders have to balance the trade-off between the 
need for funds and the costs associated with a dilution in control. Bettignies and 
Brander (2007) develop this idea in a mathematical model where the firm has to choose 
between bank finance (which does not dilute ownership) and venture capital (which 
offers funds and managerial input but dilutes control). 
From an empirical perspective, Berger et al. (1997) find that CEO ownership 
and the presence of a significant blockholder positively impact on leverage. They 
attribute these findings to the idea that managers with ownership stakes are more closely 
tied to shareholders and pursue more leverage to increase the value of the business. This 
explanation, related to the signaling role of debt, is not supported in research by Du and 
Dai (2005), which instead endorses the non-dilution entrenchment argument. This 
argument states that firms prefer to finance their investments with debt over equity to 
avoid diluting their controlling position. In particular, they find that the entrenchment 
effect is stronger when there is divergence between cash flow and control rights, in 
accordance with other literature (Harvey et al., 2004; Liu and Tian, 2012). This idea of a 
firm’s controlling shareholders avoiding dilution of their controlling position is in line 
with the work by Donelli et al. (2013), who study changes in ownership control and find 
6 
 
that the main shareholders are reluctant to sell their shares, their blockholdings being on 
average high and stable over time. 
On the basis of the non-dilution entrenchment effect, we expect that main 
shareholders with a significant ownership stake will be less willing to dilute their 
control. Consequently, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the ownership in the hands of the main shareholder, the 
higher the leverage. 
2.2. Family firms and the willingness to dilute control 
The relationship between the use of debt and the willingness to dilute control can be 
moderated by the type of firm (particularly family vs non-family). Empirical studies 
find that the type of owner matters; for instance, the willingness to dilute control can be 
inferred from the changes in control in a firm over time. In this vein, Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988), in their study of listed firms, state that firms with an individual 
majority shareholder undergo fewer changes in control than firms with a corporate 
majority shareholder. Some recent articles find family control positively impacts on 
debt use in Australian (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009), Canadian (King and Santor, 2008) 
and continental European firms (Croci et al., 2011). These articles state that family 
firms issue more debt than non-family firms, in order to grow the business without 
diluting ownership. Similarly, Fu and Subramainan (2011) develop a mathematical 
model to examine the financing behavior of undiversified owner–managers and explain 
that these managers gain non-pecuniary benefits from controlling the business, which 
increase with the equity stake. These non-pecuniary benefits are well explained in the 
research by Björnberg and Nicholson (2012), who interview UK family firm owners 
and find that ownership for them has more emotional than financial value. 
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Family firms are seen as having these non-pecuniary benefits and are more 
reluctant to dilute control by reducing their equity stakes. More specifically, family 
firms are a special type of business where the main shareholders are more committed to 
the business and less willing to dilute control due to their control risk aversion (Mishra 
and McConaughy, 1999). Their greater amenity potential (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), 
which refers to the utility of being able to influence the type of goods produced by the 
business, makes them more reluctant to dilute their stake in it. Moreover, the 
psychological ownership described by Liu et al. (2012), although sometimes developed 
by non-family individuals, is more likely to exist among family owners, given their 
greater control, in-depth knowledge of the business, and self-investment in it. For these 
reasons, they are less willing than non-family firms to raise capital through equity 
offerings (Croci et al., 2011). This is viewed as a drawback of family firms by Sirmon 
and Hitt (2003), since these businesses thereby have limited sources of external finance. 
For this reason, it is important for family firms to have greater access to other funding 
sources in order to finance their investments. 
Family firms are able to access higher levels of debt financing, since they 
usually have a lower cost of debt. There are potentially three reasons for this. First, 
family members may be prepared to use their wealth as collateral. Second, family firms 
represent a unique class of shareholders with undiversified portfolios (Anderson et al., 
2003), which makes them less likely to invest in risky projects (Naldi et al., 2007); thus, 
bondholders will demand lower rents than from non-family firms, which are typically 
held by more diversified shareholders. Third, the reputation of the family (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003) and the ability to borrow (relational) social capital (Du et al., 2013) 
through family involvement (Chua et al., 2011) can also lead, respectively, to a lower 
cost of debt and improved access to debt financing. 
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Thus, given the aversion of family firms to control risk and their greater access 
to debt financing, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: The main owner’s stake in the business impacts more positively on 
leverage for family firms than for their non-family counterparts. 
Additionally, Hoy (2006) suggests that studies should compare not only family 
and non-family firms, but also multi-generational and single-generation family firms. 
As a result of making such comparisons, we posit that the willingness to dilute control 
differs between young and old family firms, since the succession process entails a 
change of control. Franks et al. (2012), when studying the existence of an ownership life 
cycle in family firms, state that the control in the business varies among different types 
of family firms. When the firm is owned by the first generation, founders are generally 
unwilling or reluctant to dilute their control in the business (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). 
However, as the firm grows older and control is in the hands of different family 
members, this may lead to family conflict over control and ultimately to a sale of the 
business itself. Therefore, it is expected that the owners of family firms in second and 
subsequent generations will be more willing to dilute control in the business than their 
counterparts in the first generation. 
Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) also find different degrees of willingness to dilute 
control for different family firms. Willingness is lowest in those stages where the family 
influence is strongest or, as they put it, when the socio-emotional endowment is at its 
highest. This strong family influence is more likely to be found in young family firms 
than in older ones. This is consistent with the idea that the original entrepreneur’s 
ownership is distributed mainly to the family when there are more, and closer, family 
ties (Kotha and George, 2012). 
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Therefore, although family owners typically seek to transfer the business to the 
next generation of the family (Westhead et al., 2001), there are many scenarios that 
result in indecision and conflict among family members (Blumentritt et al., 2013) and 
eventually lead to a dilution of their stake. Amore et al. (2011) study the relationship 
between the use of debt and managerial succession in listed and non-listed family firms. 
They find that the appointment of a professional manager to run the business increases 
debt, and that this increase is greater when the family firm is young. In their analysis 
they explain that family firms avoid issuing equity to prevent the dilution of control, and 
prefer to issue debt . 
In addition, Michiels et al. (2013) conclude that agency costs related to parental 
altruism are lower in later generations of family firms. One form of parental altruism 
can be the avoidance of diluting the family stake, in order to secure the interest of future 
generations in the family business. Thus, family firms in the first generation will tend to 
show more altruistic behavior, resulting in greater unwillingness to dilute control. From 
this, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b: The positive impact of the main owner’s stake on leverage is stronger 
when the business is a young family firm. 
2.3. Firm life cycle and the willingness to dilute control 
The use of equity and debt financing varies for firms in different stages of the life cycle. 
Similarly, different capital structures are optimal at different stages (Berger and Udell, 
1998), because of changes in firm characteristics that in turn represent a change in its 
optimal level of debt (Mitton, 2008). Advantages and disadvantages from a trade-off 
perspective are examined in a few papers (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer andVishny, 1997), 
which find that the control afforded by debt is less important in growing young 
businesses with less free cash flow, since these organizations go regularly to the 
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financial markets in order to obtain capital (e.g., via venture capital investors; Popov 
and Roosenboom, 2013). One of the reasons why growing businesses choose a lower 
level of debt to finance their investments is because the control function of debt (known 
as “opportunity wealth loss” in Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is costly when bondholders 
do not allow the business to undertake investments even with positive net present value. 
Furthermore, Stulz (1990) examines how the capital structure of a business depends on 
its investment opportunities and the distribution of cash flow, which are among the 
characteristics that differentiate a firm’s life-cycle stages. 
The broad literature on capital structure includes only a few papers explicitly 
analyzing the impact of life cycle on a firm’s financing decisions (Hirsch and Walz, 
2011), and most of them differentiate only between growth and maturity stages. For 
instance, Bulan and Yan (2009) find that mature businesses have higher leverage since 
they prefer debt to equity and are able to borrow more easily and at a lower cost. 
Furthermore, Dudley (2012) observes that firms issue more equity to finance the initial 
stages of a project, but when assets are in place that serve as collateral in the later 
stages, they issue more debt. 
Thus, we expect that the willingness to dilute control will be moderated by the 
life-cycle stage of the business. There are two main characteristics that differentiate our 
three life-cycle stages – growth, revival and maturity – in terms of their impact on 
capital structure: the firm’s investment opportunities and its access to debt financing. 
First, growth and revival businesses are characterized by having high financing needs 
because of their growth opportunities, and their willingness to dilute control via equity 
is greater than in mature businesses, since it is not possible to finance their investment 
demands without increasing capital. Second, not all businesses can access debt 
financing, and where they can, not all can do so at the same costs. Businesses that are 
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stable and thriving, and enjoy a higher reputation, such as those in the maturity and 
revival stages, will be able to access debt at better contract conditions, and thus their 
leverage will be higher. This is in line with Bessler et al. (2013), who find that most 
zero-leverage businesses are in fact constrained by their debt capacity. 
Given these two characteristics that differentiate the life-cycle stages 
(investment opportunities and access to debt financing), we expect financing behavior to 
be different at different stages, and we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive impact of the main owner’s stake on leverage is moderated 
by life-cycle stage. 
3. Research method 
3.1. Sample and data 
We use several data sources for our analysis. First, financial and stock data are collected 
via the Worldscope database. Then, to ensure that the age variable corresponds to the 
firm’s age from foundation (and not, e.g., from the first IPO or merger) we establish the 
year of foundation from the individual corporate websites. Second, ownership 
concentration, based on the voting rights of the main shareholder, is extracted from 
Amadeus, a database from Bureau van Dijk that makes it possible to differentiate 
between different types of owners. Following Bena and Ortiz-Molina (2013), we then 
construct an annual panel of ownership data using a DVD update for each year. Finally, 
for the construction of one of our dependent variables of leverage, we require 
macroeconomic variables such as the rate of interest of long-term and short-term debt, 
and the growth of capital goods prices. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and Eurostat are the sources used to extract these variables. 
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Our starting point is all European listed firms where the above-mentioned 
information is available. From these we obtain a sample of publicly traded firms from 
the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK. We note that Europe is an excellent environment in which to 
study the willingness of the main owner to dilute control, since ownership concentration 
is high; on average, half of the firms in our European sample have a significant 
shareholder with more than 40.50% of voting rights. We exclude financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000–6999) and regulated public utilities (SIC codes 4812, 4813, 4900–4999, 
2830–2833), since government regulation potentially affects the equity ownership 
structure of these businesses. 
The time period for our analysis is 2000–2009. We consider only those firms 
with at least six consecutive years of available data; a requirement for building the m 
statistic that tests the absence of second order serial correlation in the first difference 
residuals, since we use the GMM. We thus obtain an unbalanced panel of 1,050 firms 
(8,357 observations). The use of an unbalanced panel for a long time period is the best 
way to resolve the attrition bias caused by the fact that some firms may be delisted (e.g., 
those that file for bankruptcy) and, consequently, removed from the database. 
3.2. Method of life-cycle stage identification 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 summarizes a number of research papers that empirically determine different 
organizational life-cycle stages. Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) review 104 research 
papers on business growth stage models published between 1962 and 2006. These 
authors’ main conclusion is that there is no consensus within the business life-cycle 
literature concerning the number of stages, the nature of each stage or the reasons for 
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moving between them. This lack of unity also leads to the development of different 
methodologies to determine the stages. Some of these articles establish a priori the 
number of stages using different quantitative variables (Grabowski and Mueller, 1975; 
Berger and Udell, 1998; Dickinson, 2011), such as size, age, dividends, sales and, in 
some cases, subjective criteria (Miller and Friesen, 1984). Some use only an age 
variable in their study of the relationship between life-cycle theory and capital structure 
(Bulan and Yan, 2009; La Rocca et al., 2011; Serrasqueiro and Maçãs, 2012). However, 
these studies suffer from limitations in their definition of the life-cycle stages. Age on 
its own may be misleading; for instance, some young businesses disappear after the first 
years of their existence (especially in high technology industries; Song et al., 2008), and 
with only an age variable they would therefore be categorized in a growth stage when 
they are actually in a decline stage. 
In general terms, the above articles find the same stages as noted by Miller and 
Friesen (1984): birth, growth, maturity, revival and decline. We follow Pashey and 
Philippatos (1990) and Lester et al. (2004) in using a cluster analysis to identify the life-
cycle stages. The main advantage of this methodology is that it allows us to jointly 
consider multiple variables in the analysis. Additionally, our methodology follows the 
dynamic stage approach mentioned by Levie and Lichtenstein (2010), where there is not 
a pre-established number or sequence of stages, and each stage is driven by the market 
and the capacity of the business to create opportunities. In Appendix 1 there is a detailed 
explanation of the factor analysis and cluster technique process. 
Based on these analyses, we conclude that Cluster 1 represents the group of 
firms in a maturity stage, Cluster 2 those in a revival stage and Cluster 3 those in a 
growth stage. Thus, we consider three out of the five most common stages: maturity, 
growth and revival. The other two stages – birth and decline – do not appear in our 
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sample. First, since the sample is composed of listed firms, there is no birth stage. 
Second, given that we need information on the firms for at least six consecutive years 
(as mentioned above), it is very likely that firms in a decline stage will have been 
excluded from the sample. In addition, following life-cycle stage theory, we study the 
possible changes from one stage to another, as explained in Appendix 2. 
3.3. Variables 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
All the variables are defined in detail in Table 2. Our main dependent variable is market 
leverage, defined as the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of the book 
value of long-term debt, the book value of short-term debt and the market value of 
equity. In addition, we use as robustness tests two other dependent variables. The first 
of these is another market variable, market leverage 2, defined as for our main market 
leverage variable but using a proxy for the market value of long-term debt as in Pindado 
et al. (2011). The second is book leverage, defined as the book value of long-term debt 
to total assets. 
To test our hypotheses we use ownership concentration as the explanatory 
variable, measured by the percentage of shares in the hands of the main shareholder. We 
interact this continuous variable with several dummy variables to study their moderating 
impact on the ownership–leverage relationship. The first two dummy variables are 
related to the type of owner, and the other three to the firm’s life-cycle stages. The first 
dummy variable, family firm dummy, is coded 1 for a family firm. For this, the firm 
should satisfy three requirements: (i) “family shareholdings” to be those of a family or, 
in the case of multiple stakes held by individuals, aggregated across individuals within 
the same family (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Franks et al., 2012); (ii) these 
shareholdings to be larger than 15%; and (iii) the family shareholding to be the largest 
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stake in the firm. The second dummy variable, young family firm dummy, is coded 1 
for a young family firm. For this, the firm should satisfy two requirements: it must (i) be 
a family firm, and (ii) be younger than 30 years old since foundation1. The third dummy 
variable, maturity, is coded 1 if the firm is in the maturity stage of its organizational 
life-cycle. The fourth dummy variable, revival, is coded 1 if the firm is in a revival 
stage. Finally, the fifth dummy variable, growth, is coded 1 if the firm is in a growth 
stage. 
As control variables we use the variables commonly used in the capital structure 
literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Miguel and Pindado, 2001; Korajczyk and Levy, 
2003; Welch, 2004; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). These variables are profitability, size, 
tangibility, market-to-book ratio, non-debt tax shields, financial distress costs and stock 
returns. 
3.4. Model 
We develop a partial adjustment model of leverage, where we assume market 
imperfections such as transaction costs (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The equation that 
describes the adjustment model can be written as shown in Eq. (1). 
 , − ,
 = (,
∗ − ,
) , (1) 
where , is the current leverage ratio, ,
 is the leverage ratio of the previous 
year; and ,
∗  is the target leverage ratio.   is the adjustment coefficient, ranging 
from zero to 1. If  is 1, this means that the business is totally adjusted to its target 
leverage, which could only happen in a complete and perfect market. The model for the 
target leverage can be expressed as Eq. (2). 
                                                 
1
 We use the same approach as Fiss and Zajac (2004), who consider firms younger than 30 years old to be 
controlled by the founder or their offspring, and older firms to be controlled by later generations. Our aim 
is to show the differences between young and old family firms, since succession decisions involve 
changes in ownership structure, which in turn involve a change in financing preferences.  
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 ,
∗ = ℎ	 
 +(ϓ"#$$%)ℎ	 + &'( +	) + * , (2) 
where the term "#$$% represents each of the dummy variables, as explained above, 
that moderate the relationship between ownership and leverage; '( contains the 
explanatory variables explained previously, )  includes the individual effect, and ϵ,- 
includes the temporal dummies and the error term. 
If we introduce Equation 2 into Equation 1 and realign the terms, we obtain the 
following model in Eq. (3): 
 , = (1− α),
 + αℎ	 
 +(αϓ"#$$%)ℎ	 + α&'( + ) + * (3) 
We test our hypotheses using Equation 3, since our main goal is to study the 
relationship between ownership and leverage, and the moderating effects of business 
type and life-cycle stage on this relationship. 
3.5. Econometric analysis 
We estimate the models using panel data methodology, which has two main advantages. 
First, it controls for individual effects or unobserved heterogeneity, such as the family 
attachment that causes some family owners to be less willing than others to dilute 
control and, as a result, affects their level of ownership in the business. We take first 
differences to eliminate any unobserved heterogeneity. Second, this method helps to 
mitigate the endogeneity problem that occurs when the error term is correlated with any 
of the explanatory variables. To solve this problem we use a method of instrumental 
variables: the GMM, which encompasses all methods of instrumental variables. 
Specifically, we use the system GMM (as Bonaimé et al., 2014) to overcome the weak 
instruments problem that the difference GMM suffers from. 
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First of all, following Wintoki et al. (2012), we choose a set of instruments that 
fulfill two requirements: exogeneity and strength. As usual in the GMM literature we 
use as instruments the lags of the explanatory variables. However, in order to decide 
how many lags to use as instruments, we take into account the trade-off between the 
exogeneity and strength of each instrument; longer lags are more exogenous but the 
instrument will also be weaker. 
To choose the best instruments, we first use the following set of instrumental 
variables: for the equations in differences the dependent variable is at t–2 and the 
explanatory variables are from t–1 to t–2; for the equations in levels the dependent 
variable is at t–1 and the explanatory variables are at t. To analyze the exogeneity of 
these instrumental variables we use the Hansen test, which tests the validity of the 
instruments. Thus, if the instruments are exogenous, we will not reject the null 
hypothesis of a lack of correlation between the instruments and the random disturbance. 
Therefore, this is a joint test that analyzes the validity or exogeneity of all the variables 
used as instruments. However, we reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen test where 
there is a subset of instruments that are not exogenous. To determine which instruments 
are exogenous we run a difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity for this subset, under 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. To undertake this estimation 
strategy, we first need to find a large subset of instruments that are exogenous, and then 
we separately test for the exogeneity of the smaller subsets of instruments that we are 
investigating. In this way, all non-exogenous instruments are deleted from the 
instrument set. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Following the strategy outlined above, we find the instruments in the model that 
satisfy the exogenous requirement along with the strength requisite (explained below). 
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In our model, we have nine endogenous variables: all the explanatory variables except 
for the time, country and sector dummies; together with the dependent variable, which 
enters into the model lagged one period. The final instruments used for each 
endogenous variable, based on the results obtained in Table 3, are as follows. 
First, column 3 shows the difference-in-Hansen test of the exogeneity of the 
instruments for the equations in differences (where the instruments are in levels). In 
these equations we use as an instrument for the dependent variable its lag in t–4 (here 
we do not reject the null hypothesis, p-value = 0.540), since the lags from t–2 and t–3 
are not exogenous (here we do reject the null hypothesis, p-values = 0.000 and 0.034, 
respectively). Furthermore, the instruments for the equations in differences range from 
t–1 to t–2 for ownership concentration, profitability, non-debt tax shields and financial 
distress costs, since we find in column 3 that all these instruments are exogenous. Also, 
we see in column 3 that the lags in t–1 of size, tangibility, market-to-book and stock 
returns are not exogenous (the Diff-in-Hansen test for these instruments is rejected), 
thus we use as instruments their lagged values from t–2 to t–4 (the Diff-in-Hansen test 
for these instruments is not rejected). Consequently, the lags for the above-mentioned 
variables should be one period further; we therefore choose three instruments for this set 
of variables to increase the strength of the instruments set. 
Second, column 4 of Table 3 shows the Diff-in-Hansen test of the exogeneity of 
the instruments for the equations in levels, where the instruments are in differences. For 
the dependent variable, size, market-to-book and stock returns, the instruments used are 
in t–1, since they are exogenous when lagged one period but they are not in t. The 
instruments are in t for ownership concentration, profitability, non-debt tax shields and 
financial distress costs, since they are exogenous in t (see column 4). We do not use 
further lags because they are already included in the difference equations. Finally, we 
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use two instruments for tangibility, in t and t–1, since both are exogenous (in column 4 
we do not reject the null hypothesis). 
We also evaluate the strength of the instruments following Wintoki et al. (2012), 
who, based on prior work from Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005), 
carry out two different sets of tests to assess the strength of the instruments with the 
endogenous variables. In the first tests we study each endogenous variable separately to 
assess whether the instruments provide significant explanatory power over the 
endogenous variables, examining the F-statistic from the first-stage OLS regressions. 
We run two different regressions for each endogenous variable: one for the equations in 
differences, where the instruments are in levels, and the other for the equations in levels, 
where the instruments are in differences. In the second tests, we obtain two Cragg-
Donald statistics from a two-stage OLS regression: one for the equations in differences 
and the other for the equations in levels. This is a joint test that is more informative than 
the F-statistic when there is more than one endogenous variable in the model. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Table 4 we find the F-statistics from the first-stage OLS regressions and the 
Cragg-Donald statistics from the two-stage OLS regressions. For both the level and 
difference equations (Panels A and B respectively), all F-statistics are significant and 
higher than 10, which is the critical value corroborating the strength of the instruments 
(Staiger and Stock, 1997). This means that the lagged values of the endogenous 
variables used as instruments have significant power to explain the endogenous 
variables. Additionally, we obtain Cragg-Donald statistics for the level and difference 
equations. We compare these values with the critical values from Table 5.1 of Stock and 
Yogo (2005), which yields critical values for models containing up to three endogenous 
regressors. In our model we have nine endogenous variables and obtain for the 
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equations in levels and equations in differences Cragg-Donald statistics of 4.19 and 
3.51, respectively. We use 10 instruments for the equations in levels, and 17 for the 
equations in differences. Thus we compare the Cragg-Donald statistic of 4.19 with the 
relevant critical value of 4.45 from Stock and Yogo (2005), for when there are 10 
instrumental variables and three endogenous regressors. Since the critical value under 
these conditions decreases 0.2 points with the increase of another endogenous variable 
in the model, it seems that the value of 4.19 for a model of nine endogenous variables 
falls within the critical value range. We also compare the Cragg-Donald statistic of 3.51 
with the relevant critical value of 4.34 from Stock and Yogo (2005), for when there are 
17 instrumental variables and three endogenous regressors. With a decrease of 0.11 
every time the model has one more endogenous regressor, it seems that the Cragg-
Donald statistic of 3.51 falls within the limits of these critical values. With these Cragg-
Donald statistics we can confirm that the bias from using the above instruments is less 
than 30% of the bias from an OLS regression, at the 5% level of significance. Overall, 
the first-stage OLS regressions and the Cragg-Donald statistics for the equations in 
levels and the equations in differences reaffirm that the endogenous variables are 
strongly correlated with the instruments, and thus that the estimates from the system 
GMM regressions are not biased due to weak instruments. 
Have established a set of instruments that pass the exogeneity and strength tests, 
we estimate the model and conduct several specification tests. First, we run the Hansen 
test, the joint test that checks for a lack of correlation between the instruments and 
random disturbance. Second, we run the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of the 
instruments in levels, following Eichembaum et al. (1988), which checks whether any 
correlation between the endogenous variables and individual effects is constant over 
time. Third, we run the m test, derived by Arellano and Bond (1991), which tests for a 
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lack of second order serial correlation of the first differenced residuals. Finally, we run 
four Wald tests to check for the joint significance of reported coefficients, and 
(unreported) time, country and industry variables. All the models pass these 
specification tests. 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 contains the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values of 
the variables used in the models, together with their correlation matrix. Panel A presents 
the summary statistics of our dependent variables (the two market leverage measures 
and book leverage), the explanatory variable of interest (ownership concentration) and 
the rest of the control variables defined in Table 2. The mean values for the two market 
leverage variables and the book leverage variable are 0.19, 0.19 and 0.16, respectively; 
the latter value is lower than a sample of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
with an average book value of 0.65 (Molly et al., 2012). This lower level of debt is 
consistent with listed firms, where there are other important external financing sources 
that allow them to reduce their level of debt. For instance, the mean market leverage for 
industrial listed firms in the work by Barclay et al. (2013) is 0.18. Our main explanatory 
variable, ownership concentration in the hands of the main shareholder, has an average 
value of 0.41; while this is a high level for listed firms, it is usual for countries with 
lower protection for minority shareholders. 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the 
models. Our two market-dependent variables are highly correlated (0.99) and both are 
also highly correlated with the book leverage measure (0.81 and 0.81). Regarding the 
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correlations between the explanatory variables, only the financial distress costs variable 
has a high correlation with profitability. However, the value of the Variance Impact 
Factor for these two variables is smaller than 5, so it is unlikely that we have 
multicollinearity problems across these variables. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Panel A of Table 6 presents mean tests comparing the mean values of our 
variables in the model between family and non-family firms. All of the firm-level 
characteristics appear to have differences, with ownership concentration and size being 
the most significant. Moreover, family firms have lower financial distress costs and 
tangibility at the 10% significance level, lower non-debt tax shields at the 1% level, and 
higher market-to-book, profitability and stock returns at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel B of Table 6 contains mean tests that compare the differences between 
young family firms and the rest of the firms. Most of the variables in the model are 
statistically different for these two samples at the 99% level. Young family firms, in 
comparison with their non-family and old family counterparts, have higher ownership, 
financial distress costs, market-to-book ratios and stock returns; but lower size, 
tangibility and non-debt tax shields. 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 provides the results from the estimation of Eq. (3) using our main market 
leverage variable. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the results for Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, and 
3, respectively. In column 1 of Table 7, we find that ownership concentration in the 
hands of the main shareholder has a positive effect (β=0.051, p<.01) on leverage. This 
supports Hypothesis 1, which states that the higher the ownership in the hands of the 
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main shareholder, the higher the leverage. The avoidance of control loss is also 
explained by Cho et al. (2014), who find that strong creditor protection reduces long-
term debt. They only focus, however, on the loss of control represented by the 
likelihood of financial distress, and do not explain the loss of control that shareholders 
face when issuing equity. 
A contradictory result is the one found by La Rocca et al. (2011), who also 
include ownership concentration as one of their explanatory variables to determine the 
level of debt in small and medium-sized Italian firms, and obtain a negative 
relationship; that is, those firms with higher ownership concentration are more involved 
in the business and have lower incentives to give part-control to the bank. This 
contradictory result may be because they focus on a sample comprising small and 
medium-sized firms that do not have access to public financial markets. In this 
environment, where investments require less financing, debt can be replaced by internal 
funds more easily than in the context of listed firms, where investments require external 
financing and the greatest dilution of control is not represented by the issue of debt, but 
of equity. Thus, one important consideration when studying the determinants of capital 
structure is the size of the firms included in the study. This argument is in agreement 
with Beck et al. (2008), who find different financing behavior between large and small 
firms, especially in the use of bank finance, which is lower for smaller firms. 
Furthermore, differences in financing behavior between listed and non-listed 
firms are obvious. The choice of listing or not listing the firm can be a signal of the type 
of entrepreneur who runs it (Schwienbacher, 2007). Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) find 
different ownership structures between listed and non-listed firms in their database 
comprising 19 European countries. Specifically, 85.45% of non-listed firms have a 
shareholder with a stake of 50% or more, while the percentage decreases to 30% for the 
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listed sample. When the firm is not listed, the financing choice will be made between 
two main options, debt and internal funds, with debt implying a greater loss of control 
(Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007). However, when the firm is listed, financing 
with internal funds may not be enough, and the main question is whether to finance 
chiefly with debt or equity. In this case, the financing choice that represents the greater 
loss of control is equity, not debt. Ownership continues to have the same meaning (that 
is, an aversion of the main owner to diluting control) but the difference between a 
privately and publicly held framework is the extent to which each of the financing 
sources represents a loss of control. 
Column 2 of Table 7 extends our basic model by entering a family firm dummy 
variable. Despite family firms being characterized by their long-term perspective – and 
it is this “continuity” goal of family firms that leads them to behave as stewards of the 
organization (Miller et al., 2008; Eddleston et al., 2012) – we find no support for 
Hypothesis 2a, which states that the main owner’s stake in the business impacts more 
positively on leverage for family firms than for their non-family counterparts 
However, we do find differences between young family firms and the rest of the 
sample. Column 3 of Table 7 tests for the young family firm effect since we enter a 
dummy variable that captures this effect. The coefficient of ownership concentration for 
young family firms is 0.2 (β + γ = 0.029 +0.171), which is stronger than for their non-
family and old family counterparts (0.029). This result provides empirical support for 
Hypothesis 2b, which states that the positive impact of the main owner’s stake on 
leverage is stronger when the business is a young family firm. One of the most striking 
differences between young and old family firms is the occurrence of family conflicts in 
old family firms when a succession process takes place. Blumentritt et al. (2013) discuss 
scenarios that create conflicts among family members, such as the lack of capacity or 
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interest of a founder’s offspring to replace them, or competition between several 
offspring to reach the top position in the business. Some of these conflicts may result in 
greater dilution of family ownership and diminish the attachment of family owners to 
the business. Thus, ownership is the way to guarantee the power and legitimacy to 
fulfill one’s non-economic goals for the business (Chrisman et al., 2012). However, 
such goals may be more prevalent and intense in young family firms, where the 
attachment to the business and these non-economic goals can make young family firms 
less willing to dilute control than non-family and old family firms. 
The model whose coefficients are presented in column 4 of Table 7 tests for the 
life-cycle differences addressed in Hypothesis 3, which establishes that the positive 
impact of the main owner’s stake on leverage is moderated by life-cycle stage. The 
coefficients of ownership concentration for mature, revival and growth firms are 0.064, 
0.016 (β + γ = 0.064 – 0.048), and –0.03 (β + γ = 0.064 – 0.094), respectively. Thus, as 
ownership concentration increases, leverage increases for businesses in the maturity 
stage, remains neutral for those in revival and decreases for those in growth. However, 
La Rocca et al. (2011) find a contradictory result. They find a quadratic relationship 
between leverage and age, where age is used to analyze the capital structure decisions 
across the life-cycle. They conclude that in the early stages debt is used as the main 
source of financing, while in the maturity stage internal capital is preferred. This is 
again consistent with a framework of small and medium-sized businesses, where the 
two sources of financing are debt and internal funds. In this environment, the source 
with more potential to finance investment is debt, and more will be required when the 
business is in a growth stage. In a framework of publicly held firms, however, it is 
equity rather than debt that represents the most accessible source of financing to 
develop new investments. 
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Regarding the control variables, we find that leverage is negatively related to 
profitability. More profitable businesses have greater internal funds, thus there is less 
need for debt financing, following a pecking order theory. Furthermore, leverage is 
positively related to tangibility, in line with the static theory of capital structure that 
which states that businesses with higher liquidation value (for instance, those with 
tangible assets) have higher debt levels, since they can use such tangibles as collateral 
(Norden and Van Kampen, 2013). Size also has a positive effect on leverage, since 
larger firms have better reputations and can reach higher levels of debt. The results of 
these control variables are in line with previous research, such as by Fan et al. (2012). 
In addition, leverage is positively related to investment opportunities, proxied by 
the market-to-book ratio. Businesses with a high market-to-book ratio tend to have 
greater capacity to borrow and hence have higher leverage. Furthermore, leverage is 
negatively related to non-debt tax shields, thus supporting trade-off theory; this reflects 
the substitutability of the benefits of tax deduction for depreciation and the tax benefits 
of debt (Richardson et al., 2014). The positive effect of our financial distress costs 
measure on market leverage is explained by the fact that when the probability of 
insolvency increases, investors sell their stock, the market value of equity diminishes 
and leverage increases. Interestingly, when we use book leverage as the dependent 
variable, the relationship is negative or not significant, and this likely reflects the 
variable not being part of investors’ expectations. Finally, in line with the previous 
logic, stock return is negatively related to leverage: when stock price increases, the 
market value of equity increases and the leverage ratio decreases. 
4.3. Additional tests 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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We proposed Hypothesis 1 on the basis that any positive relationship between leverage 
and ownership concentration would be due to the non-dilution entrenchment effect; that 
is, firms with significant shareholders are more averse to diluting control via the issue of 
equity and prefer to obtain financing through debt. However, this positive relationship 
might also be explained by signaling theory, which states that controlling owners prefer 
debt in order to signal to the outside capital market that they are willing to maintain 
financial discipline with high leverage. To ascertain whether our results are driven by 
the entrenchment effect or by signaling theory, we follow the work by Du and Dai 
(2005), who investigate which theory explains the positive relationship between 
ownership and debt. They study this relationship in countries with different levels of 
creditor rights protection; if the relationship is stronger in countries with stronger 
creditor rights, they posit that signaling theory is the driving force, because debt can 
play a credible role in signaling when creditor rights and bankruptcy procedures are 
more robust.  
We undertake the same analysis in Table 8. We use the creditor rights index of 
Djankov et al. (2007), which updates the index of La Porta et al. (1998); it uses the 
same four attributes to construct the index, which ranges from 0 to 4 with higher values 
representing stronger protection of creditor rights. The only differences between the two 
indexes are in the Netherlands (an index of 2 that changes to 3) and Sweden (an index 
of 2 that changes to 1); the original index has been stable over the period 1978–2003. 
Among the 16 countries that compose our sample, the only country with a creditor 
rights index of 4 is the United Kingdom; there is also only one country, France, with an 
index of 0, and the index varies from 1 to 3 across the other 14 countries. Then we 
construct a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the creditor rights index is above the 
median and zero otherwise, and interact this dummy with the ownership concentration 
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variable. We also use another index, suggested by Du and Dai (2005), to consider the 
effectiveness of creditor rights enforcement: the enforceable creditor rights index. This 
index is the result of the interaction of the Djankov et al. (2007) creditor rights index 
with the La Porta el al. (1998) rule of law index, and again, we construct a dummy 
variable coded 1 if the built index is above the median and zero otherwise. Then we 
interact this second dummy with the ownership concentration variable. 
Estimated from the original model, the results of the interaction term of 
ownership concentration and the creditor rights index dummy are displayed in column 1 
of Table 8. If the signaling effect was the driving force of the positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and leverage, the interaction term would be positive, 
suggesting that firms use debt as a signal of financial discipline more intensively in 
countries with stronger creditor rights than elsewhere because such a signal is more 
credible and effective. However, the interaction term is not significant, suggesting that 
the impact of ownership concentration on leverage is the same for firms regardless of 
the strength of creditor rights. As can be seen in column 2 of Table 8, we find the same 
result when we interact the ownership concentration variable with the enforceable 
creditor rights index dummy, from which the interaction term is again not significant. 
Thus, in line with the results of Du and Dai (2005), we find that signaling theory does 
not seem to explain the positive impact of ownership concentration on leverage. 
Additionally, as in Kale et al. (2013), we derive further results using book 
leverage as the dependent variable (defined in Table 2). Hypotheses 1, and 2b are 
supported by these results. Hypothesis 3 is partially supported, since growth (mature) 
firms are found to be the most (least) willing to dilute control, but differences between 
mature and revival firms are not supported. (These results are available upon request.) 
In addition, we perform another series of robustness tests (also available upon request), 
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which support Hypotheses 1, 2b and 3 and the signs of the control variables. First, we 
estimate the models using the alternative definition of market leverage. Second, we use 
three different thresholds in defining the family firm and young family firm dummy 
variables (10%, 20% and 25%). Third, we construct our control variables using total 
assets instead of the replacement value of total assets. Fourth, we test our hypotheses 
using a reduced sample that excludes businesses exhibiting stage changes (Changes 7 
and 8) not supported by a life-cycle theory, as explained in Appendix 2. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies the relationship between leverage and a firm’s willingness to dilute 
control, proxied by the percentage of shares held by the main owner. It also analyzes the 
moderating effects of two factors on this relationship: ownership type and business life-
cycle stage. In particular, we study the moderating effect of family vs non-family; and 
mature vs revival vs growth firms. We use panel data of 1,050 firms (8,357 
observations) from 16 European countries for the period 2000–2009. 
Our study reaches several conclusions. First, the relationship between leverage 
and the main shareholder’s stake is positive. Specifically, larger stakes in the firm are 
associated with more involvement and a greater attachment to the business, and less 
willingness to dilute control. This is known as the non-dilution entrenchment effect, and 
leads the firm to issue more debt, a financing source with less loss of control for listed 
firms. 
Second, the positive relationship between leverage and ownership is stronger 
when the business is a young family firm. Family firms are a special type of firm, more 
tied to the business (thus more averse to control risk) and more able to issue debt at 
lower costs given their undiversified portfolios and reputation. These two reasons lead 
them to increase their aversion to diluting control and to strengthen the effect of 
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ownership on leverage. In addition, young family firms are typically characterized by 
the presence of the founder, who may be reluctant to dilute family control given their 
long-term perspective. However, as a family firm grows older, more succession 
conflicts arise and this can lead to a dilution of the family stake. 
Third, the relationship between ownership and leverage is moderated by the life-
cycle stage of a business: positive for those in the maturity stage, neutral for those in 
revival and negative for those in growth. Thus, mature businesses will be more 
leveraged than revival, and revival more leveraged than growth. 
Finally, this study offers practical implications. Our results provide some 
understanding for shareholders about the financing behavior of young family firms. 
When investors select a business to invest in, they should consider the ownership 
distribution, and the type and organizational stage of the business. Trade-offs between 
the control risk aversion of young family firms and the need for external financing 
should be balanced by investors when valuing the relevant financing decisions made by 
the firm. 
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Appendix 1: Factor and cluster analysis of life-cycle stages. 
Prior to the cluster technique, we use a factor analysis to reduce the number of variables 
that determine the different organizational life-cycle stages. We use the following 
variables (as defined in Table 2 above) as raw inputs into the factor analysis, for 
empirical or theoretical categorization of the life-cycle stages: size, age, profitability, 
cash flow, Tobin’s q, volatility, sales growth and dividends. Before applying the factor 
analysis, we check the fitness of these variables for analysis. We test for correlation via 
the correlation matrix, the Bartlett test of sphericity, the measure of sampling adequacy 
(MSA) also known as the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) test, and the anti-image 
correlation matrix. The null hypothesis of the Barlett test of sphericity states that the 
correlation matrix is the identity matrix. We reject this hypothesis at the 99.99% level. 
The MSA or KMO tests check whether or not the information in the sample should be 
reduced. This test should be higher than 0.5 or 0.6. In our studies it takes the value of 
0.698. In the anti-image correlation matrix the coefficients of the diagonal should be 
higher than 0.5. All the coefficients follow this requirement. 
[Insert Table A.1.1 here] 
Once we have checked that all variables meet the criteria to be considered in the 
analysis, we assess the number of factors to extract, using the eigenvalue or latent root 
criterion. The first four eigenvalues were: 2.9918, 1.6837, 1.0201 and 0.8900. We retain 
the first three factors, which explain almost 71.20% of the variance of the data set. 
Table A.1.1 contains the factor loadings of the orthogonal varimax matrix, the 
communality of each variable, and the factor scores. We rotate the first matrix using an 
orthogonal varimax rotation method, the preferred approach when the goal is to reduce 
the data to a set of variables for subsequent use in other multivariate techniques. 
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We can see in Table A.1.1 the variables that strongly define each factor. The 
uniqueness gives the proportion of the common variance of the variable not associated 
with the factors. Thus, the communality that is the uniqueness – 1 gives the proportion 
of variance that each variable retains after the factor extraction. The variables with less 
communality (but still an acceptable level) are age, Tobin’s q and sales growth. With 
respect to the loadings, we consider those that are practically significant; that is, greater 
than or equal to ±0.50. We find no problematic variables; for example, with no 
practically significant loadings, with communality deemed too low or with cross-
loadings (that is, significant loadings for more than one factor). Furthermore, most of 
the significant loadings are greater than 0.70, which is indicative of a well-defined 
structure. 
Factor 1 is positively associated with profitability and cash flow, and negatively 
with volatility (in this order); thus representing the economic survivorship of the 
business. Factor 2 is positively associated with size and dividends; thus perhaps 
reflecting the reputation of the business. Factor 3 is positively associated with the 
growth of sales and Tobin’s q, and negatively with age; thus representing the growth 
opportunities of a business. We use as robustness tests other rotation methods such as 
quartimax, equamax and parsimax, and the results and interpretations remain essentially 
the same. The only small difference occurs with the equamax method, where age does 
not reach the 0.50 loading, and has very similar loadings for Factors 2 and 3; however, 
this difference disappears when we validate the results. To test the validity of the 
analysis we randomly split the sample and do the analysis for both samples, where the 
interpretations of the results are the same for each of the rotation methods. 
[Insert Table A.1.2 here] 
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We now use these three factors in the cluster analysis. Given the substantial size 
of the sample (8,357 observations), we use a hybrid method of analysis which consists 
of developing a hierarchical clustering method in the first step, and a non-hierarchical 
clustering method (k-means) in the second step, using the number of cluster and seed 
points (centroids) from the previous step. We find a three-cluster solution where the 
distribution of the observations is 76.95%, 10.83% and 12.22%, respectively, for each 
of the three groups, (see Panel A of Table A.1.2). In summary (see Panel B of Table 
A.1.2), Cluster 1 is the group with the highest economic survivorship (Factor 1), lowest 
growth opportunities (Factor 3) and moderate level of reputation (Factor 2). Cluster 2 is 
the group with the highest growth opportunities (along with Cluster 3) and reputation, 
and moderate economic survivorship. Cluster 3 is the group with the lowest economic 
survivorship and reputation, but highest growth opportunities (along with Cluster 2). 
We can conclude that Cluster 1 represents the group of firms that are in a maturity 
stage, Cluster 2 those in a revival stage, and Cluster 3 those in a growth stage. The main 
difference between Clusters 2 and 3 is that, despite both including firms with high 
growth opportunities, they have different structures. Cluster 2 appears to represent the 
characteristics of a firm coming from a stable maturity stage (since economic 
survivorship and reputation are higher) but experiencing new opportunities in the 
market; hence the description of this stage by some authors as the “revival” stage. 
Cluster 3, however, seems to represent the characteristics of a firm in a growth stage, 
where economic survivorship (given the lack of stability and internal funds) and 
reputation are lower. 
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Appendix 2: Concordance between sample and life-cycle theory 
We present the possible changes made from one organizational life-cycle stage to 
another in the sample. As can be seen in Table A.2.1, Changes 1, 2 and 3 capture the 
firms and observations that remained constant in the maturity, revival and growth 
stages, respectively. More than half of firms in the sample did not change their life-
cycle stage for any period: 58.26% (3,747*100/6,431) of the observations are for a 
constant maturity stage, 48.06% (435*100/905) for a constant revival stage and 4.9% 
(50*100/1021) for a constant growth stage. Thus, the most stable stage is the maturity 
stage followed by revival and finally by growth. Changes 4, 5 and 6 are already 
explained in the life-cycle literature, while Changes 7, 8 and 9 are not considered by any 
sequential logic theory in the literature. Changes 7 and 8, however, represent a tiny 
proportion of the sample (0.16% and 0.02%, respectively). Change 4 (growth to 
maturity) is explained in Table A.2.2, where we compare Change 9 (maturity to growth) 
with Change 5 (maturity to revival), which is already considered in the literature. Both 
changes have in common the initial stage before they change: the maturity stage. We 
find that firms that experience Change 5 have higher age, size, cash flow, tangibility and 
profitability variables, and pay more dividends. Thus, these firms have a more stable 
situation the year before they experience growth than the group experiencing Change 9. 
[Insert Table A.2.1 here] 
[Insert Table A.2.2 here] 
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Table 1 
Empirical papers on organizational life-cycle stages. 
This table summarizes the literature review of papers that have empirically determined organizational 
life-cycle stages. It includes the year of publication, the number and name of the stages identified and the 
variables used to determine these stages.  
  
Paper Year Nº stages Stages Discriminating variables 
Grabowski 
and Mueller 
 1975  2 Mature, non-mature Age (young or mature) and 
product technology (new 
or mature) 
Miller and 
Friesen 
 1984  5 
 
Birth, growth, maturity, 
revival, decline 
Numeric (age and sales 
growth) and subjective 
criteria (e.g., formalization 
of processes, organization 
structure, product 
innovation) 
Pashey and 
Philippato 
1990 4 Late expansion/early 
maturity, regenerating 
maturity, late maturity/early 
decline, decline 
Cluster: liquidity, financial 
leverage, operating 
profitability, dividend 
payment policy, sales-
generating ability and 
market power 
Berger and 
Udell 
1998  Not determined Age and size 
Lester, 
Parnell and 
Carraher 
2004 5 Existence, survival, success, 
renewal, decline 
Cluster: 20-item scale of 
managers’ perceptions 
Bulan and 
Yan 
2009 2 Growth, mature Age 
La Rocca, La 
Rocca and 
Cariola 
2011 Continuous 
variable 
Early stages, maturity stages Age 
Dickinson 2011 5 Introduction, growth, mature, 
shake-out, decline 
Sign of net operating, 
investing and financing 
cash flows 
Serrasqueiro 
and Maçãs 
 2012  2  Old, young  Age 
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Table 2 
Variable definitions. 
Variable Measurement 
Dependent variables 
Market leverage Book value of long-term debt/(book value of long-term debt + book 
value of short-term debt + market value of equity) 
Market leverage 2 Following Pindado et al. (2011): 
Market value of long-term debt /(market value of long-term debt + 
book value of short-term debt + market value of equity) 
Book leverage Book value of long-term debt/total assets 
Explanatory variables 
Ownership concentration Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder 
Family firm dummy (FFD) Coded 1 for a family firm and 0 otherwise 
Young family firm dummy 
(YFFD) 
Coded 1 for a young family firm and 0 otherwise 
Maturity dummy Coded 1 for a business at a maturity stage and 0 otherwise 
Revival dummy Coded 1 for a business at a revival stage and 0 otherwise 
Growth dummy Coded 1 for a business at a growth stage and 0 otherwise 
Control and factor analysis variables 
Profitability Earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT)/replacement value of total 
assets (K). 
Size Log of replacement value of total assets 
Tangibility Book value of tangible fixed assets/K 
Market-to-book ratio (Market value of equity + book value of total debt)/total assets 
Non-debt tax shields Book depreciation/K 
Financial distress costs Following the logistic model of Pindado et al. (2008), we predict these 
as a continuous variable ranging from 1 (high financial distress costs) 
to 0 (low financial distress costs) 
Stock returns Common equity/K 
Volatility (Standard deviation of EBIT – mean of EBIT)/K 
Cash flow (Net profit + book depreciation)/K 
Dividends Cash dividends paid 
Age Log of years since the firm was founded 
Tobin’s q (Market value of equity + market value of debt)/K 
Sales growth Growth of net sales 
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Table 3 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity. 
This table reports the Diff-in-Hansen tests for the equations in differences, in column 3, where the 
instruments are the endogenous variables lagged in levels; and the Diff-in-Hansen tests for the equations 
in levels, in column 4, where the instruments are the endogenous variables in differences. This test yields 
a J-statistic distributed as /, under the null hypothesis that the subset of instruments is exogenous. 
Endogenous variable Instrument 
Diff-in-Hansen: 
equations in  
differences 
(p-value) 
Diff-in-Hansen: 
equations in  
levels 
(p-value) 
Market leverage 01	(23
  0.508 
 01	(23
 0.000  
 01	(23
4 0.034  
 01	(23
5 0.540  
Ownership concentration ℎ	   0.527 
 ℎ	
 0.525  
 ℎ	
 0.999  
Profitability 678(%   0.790 
 678(%
 0.634  
 678(%
 0.061  
Non-debt tax shields 9	:8	;	ℎ(:   0.706 
 9	:8	;	ℎ(:
 0.883  
 9	:8	;	ℎ(:
 0.700  
Financial distress costs <(	:	  0.427 
 <(	:	
 0.303  
 <(	:	
 0.353  
Size =>  0.001 
 =>
 0.000 0.111 
 =>
 0.223  
 =>
4 0.367  
 =>
5 0.922  
Tangibility ?38(%   0.717 
 ?38(%
 0.008 0.585 
 ?38(%
 0.656  
 ?38(%
4 0.402  
 ?38(%
5 0.597  
Market-to-book ratio 01 −  − 81  0.000 
 01 −  − 81
 0.000 0.586 
 01 −  − 81
 0.119  
 01 −  − 81
4 0.526  
 01 −  − 81
5 0.372  
Stock returns =1	#   0.000 
 =1	#
 0.000 0.734 
 =1	#
 0.777  
 =1	#
4 0.545  
 =1	#
5 0.352  
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Table 4 
First-stage OLS regressions and Cragg-Donald statistics for system GMM estimates. 
This table reports the F-statistics and @ values of the first-stage OLS regressions of levels 
and first-differenced variables on lagged differences and lagged levels, respectively. The 
variables used and the Cragg-Donald statistics are explained in Subsection 3.5. 
 F-statistic p-value R
2
 
Panel A. Dependent variable in levels, explanatory variables (instruments) in differences 
Market leverage (–1) 322.24 0.00 0.0645 
Ownership concentration 1957.90 0.00 0.1098 
Profitability 501.34 0.00 0.2190 
Size 43.35 0.00 0.0072 
Tangibility 51.53 0.00 0.0317 
Market-to-book ratio 123.18 0.00 123.18 
Non-debt tax shields 682.54 0.00 0.0694 
Financial distress costs 2992.76 0.00 0.2630 
Stock returns 107.76 0.00 0.0269 
Cragg-Donald statistic: 4.19 
Panel B. Dependent variable in differences, explanatory variables (instruments) in levels 
∆Market leverage (–1) 17.81 0.00 0.0050 
∆Ownership concentration 254.54 0.00 0.1523 
∆Profitability 179.29 0.00 0.1757 
∆Size 12.11 0.00 0.0087 
∆Tangibility 22.47 0.00 0.0160 
∆Market-to-book ratio 65.51 0.00 0.1173 
∆Non-debt tax shields 176.54 0.00 0.1141 
∆Financial distress costs 545.99 0.00 0.2045 
∆Stock returns 21.11 0.00 0.0294 
Cragg-Donald statistic: 3.51 
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Table 5 
Summary statistics and correlation matrix. 
Panel A of this table reports the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values of 
each variable. Panel B reports the correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical 
models. The sample comprises 1,050 firms (8,357 observations) for the period 2000–2009. All 
variables are defined in Section 3 and Table 2. 
Panel A. Summary statistics  
  Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
1. Market leverage 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.74 
2. Market leverage 2 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.75 
3. Book leverage 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.74 
4. Ownership concentration 0.41 0.24 0.00 0.99 
5. Profitability 0.06 0.08 –0.47 0.46 
6. Size 0.04 1.78 0.84 11.86 
7. Tangibility 0.27 0.19 0.00 1.14 
8. Market-to-book ratio 0.97 0.53 0.09 4.01 
9. Non-debt tax shields 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.11 
10. Financial distress costs 0.24 0.35 0.00 1.00 
11. Stock returns 0.39 0.35 –0.65 1.19 
 
Panel B. Correlation matrix  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1.00           
2 0.99 1.00          
3 0.81 0.81 1.00         
4 0.00 0.00 –0.05 1.00        
5 –0.18 –0.19 –0.03 0.00 1.00       
6 0.19 0.18 0.22 –0.05 0.15 1.00      
7 0.33 0.33 0.34 –0.00 0.01 0.03 1.00     
8 –0.37 –0.37 0.03 –0.08 0.38 0.00 –0.06 1.00    
9 0.06 0.06 0.07 –0.06 –0.00 0.03 0.41 0.00 1.00   
10 0.12 0.12 –0.03 0.00 –0.79 –0.19 –0.04 –0.27 –0.01 1.00  
11 –0.40 –0.40 –0.39 –0.01 0.18 –0.19 0.04 0.21 0.01 –0.12 1.00 
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Table 6 
Differences of mean tests. 
Panel A of this table reports the differences between family firms and non-family firms. Panel B reports 
the differences between young family firms and non-young-family firms. The t-statistic is the difference 
of means test under the null  AB:	$DEFGH  – $IJI
DEFGH  =0 for Panel A and  
AB:	$HJKILDEFGH  – $IJI
HJKILDEFGH =0 for Panel B. Section 3 and Table 2 provide a detailed 
explanation of the variables. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Family firms vs non-family firms 
 All firms Family Non-family t-statistic 
No observations 8,357 2,045 6,312  
Market leverage 0.19 0.18 0.20 5.167*** 
Market leverage 2 0.19 0.18 0.20 5.183*** 
Book leverage 0.15 0.14 0.16 6.178*** 
Ownership concentration 0.40 0.48 0.38 –17.864*** 
Profitability 0.06 0.06 0.06 –1.934** 
Size 6.04 5.24 6.29 23.931*** 
Tangibility 0.27 0.26 0.27 1.380* 
Market-to-book ratio 0.97 0.98 0.96 –1.601* 
Non-debt tax shields 0.02 0.02 0.02 7.434*** 
Financial distress costs 0.24 0.24 0.25 1.402* 
Stock returns 0.39 0.40 0.38 –4.140*** 
Panel B. Young family firms vs non-young-family firms 
 All firms Young family Non-young-
family 
t-statistic 
No observations 8,357 750 7,607  
Market leverage 0.19 0.15 0.20 7.399*** 
Market leverage 2 0.19 0.15 0.20 7.400*** 
Book leverage 0.15 0.13 0.16 6.251*** 
Ownership concentration 0.40 0.51 0.39 –13.290*** 
Profitability 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.420 
Size 6.04 4.77 6.16 20.850*** 
Tangibility 0.27 0.20 0.27 9.723*** 
Market-to-book ratio 0.97 1.10 0.95 –6.970*** 
Non-debt tax shields 0.02 0.01 0.02 10.776*** 
Financial distress costs 0.24 0.26 0.24 –1.318* 
Stock returns 0.39 0.41 0.39 –3.568*** 
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Table 7 
Willingness to dilute control and market leverage. 
This table presents the coefficients and standard deviations of the variables (defined in Section 3 and 
Table 2) of the models, estimated by the system GMM. The dependent variable is market leverage. Time, 
country, and sector dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors are used in calculating 
t-statistics (in parenthesis).  and are t-statistics for linear restriction tests. The null hypothesis of  
states that the sum of the coefficients of ownership concentration and revival is equal to zero. The null 
hypothesis of  states that the sum of the coefficients of ownership concentration and growth is equal to 
zero. >, >, >4 and >5are Wald tests of the joint significance of the explanatory variables and the time, 
country and sector dummies, respectively, under the null of no relation, with the degrees of freedom in 
parenthesis. $ is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as / under the null of no correlation between the instruments and 
the error term. Diff-in-Hansen is also a test distributed as / under the null hypothesis that the subset of 
instruments used in the level equations are not correlated with the error term. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Dep.var:0  
1 
Hypothesis 1 
2 
Hypothesis 2a 
3 
Hypothesis 2b 
4 
Hypothesis 3 
Market leverage(–1) 0.500*** 
(0.029) 
0.498*** 
(0.029)  
0.494*** 
(0.029) 
0.497*** 
(0.028) 
Ownership concentration 0.051*** 
(0.010) 
0.050*** 
(0.011) 
0.029** 
(0.014) 
0.064*** 
(0.010) 
'1*<<"   0.003 
(0.018) 
  
'1*N<<"    0.171** 
(0.087) 
 
'1*@    –0.048*** 
(0.017) 
'1*O@P     –0.094*** 
(0.016)  
Profitability –.151*** 
(0.050) 
–0.143*** 
(0.050)  
 –0.184 
(0.115) 
–0.193*** 
(0.051) 
Size 0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
Tangibility 0.150*** 
(0.033) 
0.149*** 
(0.033) 
0.162*** 
(0.034) 
0.153*** 
(0.033)  
Market-to-book ratio 0.030*** 
(0.008)  
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
Non-debt tax shields –0.342** 
(0.153) 
–0.317** 
(0.151)  
 –0.338** 
(0.147) 
–0.344** 
(0.151) 
Financial distress costs 0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.029)  
0.042*** 
(0.009)  
Stock returns –0.160*** 
(0.034) 
–0.166*** 
(0.034) 
–0.180*** 
(0.037) 
–0.167*** 
(0.034) 
    0.858 
    –1.722** 
> 174.14 (9) 156.76 (10) 160.87 (10) 146.88 (11) 
> 52.19 (7) 52.31 (7) 43.19 (7) 52.17 (7) 
>4 3.04 (15)  3.03 (15) 3.06 (15)  2.99(15) 
>5  2.86 (6) 2.82 (6) 2.87 (6) 2.81 (6) 
$ (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
$ (p-value) (0.164) (0.163) (0.147) (0.241) 
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) (0.226) (0.228) (0.146) (0.286) 
Hansen (p-value) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.081) 
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Table 8 
Signaling vs entrenchment effects. 
This table reports the coefficients and standard deviations of the variables (defined in Section 3 and Table 
2) of the models, estimated by the system GMM. We interact two dummy variables with the ownership 
concentration variable. '@"  denotes the creditor rights dummy, coded 1 if the creditor rights index is 
above median and zero otherwise; and '@" denotes the enforceable creditor rights dummy, coded 1 if 
the enforceable creditor rights index is above median and zero otherwise The dependent variable is 
market leverage. Time, country, and sector dummies are included but not reported. Robust standard errors 
are used in calculating t-statistics (in parenthesis). >, >, >4 and >5are Wald tests of the joint significance 
of the explanatory variables and the time, country and sector dummies, respectively, under the null of no 
relation, with the degrees of freedom in parenthesis.  $  is a serial correlation test of order I using 
residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as / under the null of no 
correlation between the instruments and the error term. Diff-in-Hansen is also a test distributed as / 
under the null hypothesis that the subset of instruments used in the level equations are not correlated with 
the error term. 
***, ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Dep.var:0  1 2 
Market leverage(–1) 0.499*** 
(0.029) 
0.499*** 
(0.029) 
Ownership concentration 0.050*** 
(0.011) 
0.053*** 
(0.011) 
'1*'@"  0.000 
(0.016) 
 
'1*'@"   –0.004 
(0.015) 
Profitability –0.150*** 
(0.050) 
–0.151*** 
(0.050) 
Size 0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
Tangibility 0.148*** 
(0.033) 
0.148*** 
(0.033) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
Non-debt tax shields –0.339** 
(0.152) 
–0.339** 
(0.152) 
Financial distress costs 0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.026*** 
(0.009) 
Stock returns –0.164*** 
(0.033) 
–0.163*** 
(0.033) 
> 157.54 (10) 157.77 (10) 
> 52.80 (7) 53.05 (7) 
>4 2.03 (15) 1.97 (15) 
>5 1.98 (6) 1.91 (6) 
$	(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 
$	(p-value) (0.163) (0.163) 
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) (0.263) (0.225) 
Hansen (p-value) (0.079) (0.076) 
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Table A.1.1 
Unrotated factor pattern and factor scores from principal component analysis with varimax rotation. 
This table reports the varimax rotated loadings and factor scores from principal component analysis using the 
varimax rotation method. The variables used for the factor analysis are: size, age, profitability, cash flow, 
Tobin’s q, volatility, sales growth and dividends. These variables are defined in Table 2. 
* denotes loadings greater than ±0.50. 
Varimax-rotated loadings Factor scores 
Uniqueness 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Size 0.1213 0.8706* –0.0764 –0.0393 0.5094 0.0107 0.2215 
Age 0.1528 0.4883 –0.5086* 0.0622 0.2262 –0.4285 0.4796 
Profitability 0.9588* 0.0550 0.0930 0.3535 –0.0605 –0.0153 0.0690 
Cash flow 0.9308* 0.0601 0.0516 0.3467 –0.0589 –0.0493 0.1274 
Tobin’s q 0.4291 0.0128 0.5259* 0.1059 0.0179 0.4339 0.5392 
Volatility –0.8871* –0.1234 0.0477 –0.3340 0.0262 0.1284 0.1955 
Sales growth 0.1741 –0.2452 0.7070* –0.0683 0.1211 0.6967 0.4098 
Dividends 0.3323 0.6966* 0.3767 –0.0869 0.5255 0.1901 0.2623 
 
Table A.1.2 
Factor mean values and differences by cluster. 
This table reports the mean values and order, from higher to lower values, of 
Factors 1, 2 and 3 by cluster. Factor 1 represents economic survivorship, Factor 
2 represents firm reputation and Factor 3 represents growth opportunities. 
These factors are explained in more detail in the text of this Appendix. 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Panel A: Variable mean values by cluster 
Factor 1 0.2868 0.0546 –1.8548 
Factor 2 –0.2358 2.1446 –0.4156 
Factor 3 –0.0877 0.2352 0.3437 
Nº cases 6,431 905 1,021 
% cases 76.95 10.83 12.22 
Cluster name Maturity stage Revival stage Growth stage 
Panel B: Variable order by cluster 
Factor 1  high moderate low 
Factor 2  moderate high low 
Factor 3  low high high 
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Table A.2.1 
Change between organizational life-cycle stages. 
This table reports the nine different changes from one life-cycle stage to 
another. These stages are explained in Section 3. 
Change 
% 
observations 
Nº 
observations 
Nº  
firms 
1. Constant maturity 44.84 3747 468 
2. Constant revival 5.20 435 54 
3. Constant growth 0.59 50 7 
4. Growth to maturity 4.36 364 314 
5. Maturity to revival 1.77 148 126 
6. Revival to maturity 1.05 88 82 
7. Growth to revival 0.02 2 2 
8. Revival to growth 0.16 13 13 
9. Maturity to growth 4.46 373 310 
 
Table A.2.2 
Difference of means tests between maturity-to-revival and maturity-to-
growth firms. 
This table reports the t-statistic for the difference of means test under the 
null AB:	$FEKQH
J
QRSSEG  – $FEKQH
J
LQJTU  =0. All the 
variables are defined in Table 2. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
All firms 
Maturity 
to revival 
Maturity 
to growth 
t-statistic 
No observations 521 148 373 
Age 3.72 4.34 3.48 –10.32*** 
Size 6.11 8 5.36 –22.28*** 
Cash flow 0.06 0.09 0.05 –9.27*** 
Tangibility 0.23 0.26 0.22 –2.53*** 
Dividends 22.86 65.49 5.95 –24.76*** 
Profitability 0.06 0.1 0.05 –10.12*** 
 
